Does Agricultural Liberalization Reduce Rural Welfare in Less Developed Countries? The Case of CAFTA by Taylor, J. Edward et al.
Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics
University of California, Davis
Does Agricultural Liberalization Reduce  
Rural Welfare in Less Developed Countries?  
The Case of CAFTA
by
J. Edward Taylor, Antonio Yúnez Naude and Nancy Jesurun-Clements
Working Paper No. 07-001  
   
January 2007
 
Copyright @ 2007 by J. Edward Taylor Antonio Yúnez Naude and Nancy Jesurun-Clements
All Rights Reserved.  
Readers may make verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial  
purposes by any means, provided that this copyright notice appears on all such copies.





Does Agricultural Liberalization Reduce Rural Welfare in Less Developed 
Countries?  The Case of CAFTA 
January 2007 
J. Edward Taylor, corresponding author 
Professor of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
University of California, Davis, CA  95616. 
Phone: 530-752-0213 
Fax:  530-752-5614 
Email: taylor@primal.ucdavis.edu 
 
Antonio Yúnez Naude 
Professor in the Center of Economic Studies 
El Colegio de Mexico 
 
Nancy Jesurun-Clements 







Acknowledgements: This project would not have been possible with the participation of 
research teams at universities and research institutes in El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala y 
Nicaragua or financial support from the Swedish Agency for International Development and 
the Inter-American Development Bank.  We would also like to express thanks to Eduardo 
Baumeister, María del Carmen Bernal, Peri Fletcher, Josué Medellín-Azuara, Sybille 
Nuenninghoff, Lisa Pfeiffer and Fernando Barceinas for their support in carrying out the 
study.   2 
Abstract 
Conventional economic wisdom and findings from aggregate economy-wide models suggest that 
removing  tariffs  on  agricultural  imports  is  detrimental  to  rural  welfare  in  less  developed 
countries.  This paper explores the rural welfare effects of own-country agricultural liberalization 
under CAFTA using a disaggregated rural economy-wide model that nests within it a series of 
micro agricultural household models. Our simulation findings suggest that CAFTA would reduce 
nominal incomes for nearly all rural household groups in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and 
Nicaragua.    However,  compensating  variations  that  take  into  account  rural  economy-wide 
adjustments to policy shocks are mostly negative, implying that current agricultural protection 
policies are disadvantageous for most rural household groups.   3 
Does Agricultural Liberalization Reduce Rural Welfare in Less Developed Countries?   
The Case of CAFTA 
The impacts of market liberalization on welfare in rural areas of less developed countries 
(LDCs)  have  received  increasing  attention  from  both  researchers  and  policy  makers  as 
relatively  poor  countries  become  integrated  into  world  markets  and  trade  pacts.  
Overwhelmingly,  the  view  of  researchers  and  policy  makers  alike  has  been  that,  in  less 
developed  countries  (LDCs),  urban  residents  win  but  rural  populations  lose  from  the 
elimination of own-import tariffs on agricultural commodities.  The urban gain results from 
lower consumption costs, while the rural loss is the consequence of increased competition 
with imported agricultural and livestock goods, depressing both profits and wages in a sector 
in  which  LDCs  presumably  have  a  comparative  advantage.    This  raises  serious  welfare 
concerns, because many of the world’s poor live in rural areas. An interesting corollary to 
this argument is that agricultural support policies in developed countries adversely affect 
welfare in rural LDC households by depressing world prices for farm goods (World Bank 
2003; an excellent discussion appears in Tangermann 2005). 
In this paper we use a disaggregated rural economy-wide modeling approach (Taylor, 
Yúnez-Naude,  and  Dyer  2005)  to  explore  the  rural  welfare  impacts  of  own-country 
agricultural  tariff  reforms  called  for  in  the  Central  American  Free  Trade  Agreement 
(CAFTA)  in  four  Central  American  countries:    El  Salvador,  Guatemala,  Honduras,  and 
Nicaragua (EGHN).  Our rural economy-wide model for each country consists of a series of 
interacting  micro  agricultural  household  models.    Inasmuch  as  an  agricultural  household 
model can be viewed as a computable general equilibrium model (CGEM) for an individual 
rural  household  group  (Taylor,  Yúnez-Naude,  and  Dyer  2005),  the  disaggregated  rural 
economy-wide model (DREM) is really a nested CGEM.  To facilitate comparison, we model 
the same rural household groups in each of the four countries (subsistence grain producers;   4 
small, medium and large commercial producers; and landless rural households).  We use the 
nested rural CGEMs to simulate the impacts of country-specific agricultural provisions in 
CAFTA on the income of each rural household group.  We also perform a welfare analysis in 
which the economy-wide model is used to estimate the transfers that would be required to 
maintain all rural household groups at their pre-CAFTA welfare levels.  This transfer differs 
from  a  conventional  compensating  variation  by  taking  into  account  rural  economy-wide 




Two  considerations  have  tended  to  reinforce  the  view  that  agricultural  trade  reforms 
negatively affect rural welfare in LDCs.  First, many rural households produce grain, for 
which  high-income  countries  have  a  comparative  advantage  in  production.    Removing 
protection on grain imports thus leaves the rural economy vulnerable to competition from 
foreign grain producers.  The combination of generous support programs for grain farmers in 
high-income countries with LDC tariff reform, from this perspective, inflicts damage on the 
LDC rural economy.  More than two thirds of developing countries are net importers of food 
products (Valdes and McCalla 2004). 
Second, the effects of agricultural reforms in high-income countries are likely to be 
muted because in many cases LDCs already have preferential access to developed country 
markets for their agricultural exports.  LDCs are net exporters of tropical products, for which 
competition with developed countries generally is not an issue.  Preferential treatment covers 
a large share of developing country exports to the European Union and the United States, 
reaching over 90% of all agricultural exports to these regions for some LDCs (Wainio et al. 
2005).  The most notable preferential agreements include those between the E.U. and its   5 
members’ former colonies in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, and the Everything but 
Arms agreement; and between the United States and Africa and Latin America via the Africa 
Growth  and  Opportunity  Act  and  the  Caribbean  Basin  Initiative.    Because  of  this,  the 
argument  goes,  LDCs  stand  to  gain  less  (in  terms  of  increasing  access  to  high-income 
markets)  than  they  lose  (by  exposing  their  producers  to  foreign  competition)  from  the 
liberalization of agricultural trade.  In fact, some LDCs may lose from trade liberalization as 
a result of preference erosion (Tangermann 2005).  These considerations have been salient in 
the contentious debates over agricultural policy that characterized the Uruguay Round in the 
late 1980s and 1990s and currently plague multilateral trade negotiations under the Doha 
Development Agenda (Anderson and Martin 2005).   
Some evidence from aggregate economy-wide  models suggests that the impact of 
agricultural trade reforms in LDCs would be positive; however, the reasons lie mostly in the 
effects  that  such  reforms  would  have  on  the  nonagricultural  sector.    Tangermann  (2005) 
reports the finding from a GTAP model that full agricultural liberalization by high-income 
countries would enhance the nonagricultural terms of trade for developing countries, thus 
leading to income gains.  However, Anderson and Valenzuela (2007), using a GTAP model, 
find negative effects of own-country agricultural trade reforms on agricultural value-added in 
all the developing countries they considered.  The implication of these findings would seem 
to be that the more narrowly one focuses on the LDC rural economy and on own-country 
tariff reforms, the greater the likelihood of finding negative welfare impacts of agricultural 
trade liberalization. 
Micro agricultural household theory suggests that the impacts of agricultural market 
liberalization on LDC rural welfare are not clear cut, even if LDC producers do not acquire 
greater access to high-income markets for their agricultural output.  As producers or suppliers 
of factors (e.g., labor) to farms, rural household lose when the price of goods they produce   6 
decreases.  However, rural households also are consumers, and it is not uncommon to find 
that most producers of protected goods in LDCs are not net sellers of these goods prior to 
reforms.  Like urban households, they stand to benefit as consumers.  Whether the negative 
production or positive consumption effect dominates is an empirical question, and the answer 
is likely to be different for different rural household groups.   
Even on the production side, a decrease in price (e.g., of food grains) may benefit 
households that are  engaged in other crop activities (e.g., fruits and vegetables) if factor 
prices (e.g., wages) decrease.  Even the impacts of agricultural trade reforms on factor prices 
are ambiguous; they depend on the relative factor intensities of the directly and indirectly 
affected activities. 
Understanding the impacts of agricultural trade reforms on LDC rural economies thus 
requires an economy-wide modeling approach that embeds within it a microeconomic focus 
capturing both the heterogeneity of rural households and the diversity of activities in which 
these households participate. GTAP and other economy-wide models are useful to explore 
aggregate impacts of trade policy reforms; however, their high level of aggregation precludes 
a rural micro focus.  
 
CAFTA and Central American Agriculture 
CAFTA  represents  an  ideal  case  for  studying  the  potential  impacts  of  agricultural  trade 
reforms on rural welfare.  In EGHN, the majority of farm households cultivate food grains.  
All benefit from preferential access to U.S. markets for their agricultural exports, and all are 
net importers of grain.  Prevailing tariffs on grain imports range from 15% (yellow maize) to 
40%  (rice)  in  El  Salvador,  from  20%  (white  maize,  beans)  to  35%  (yellow  maize)  in 
Guatemala, from 15% (beans) to 45% (other grains) in Honduras,  and from 10% (white 
maize) to as high as 62% (rice) in Nicaragua.  Tariffs on livestock products in the four   7 
countries range from 15% (pork, fluid and dry milk, and cheeses in Guatemala and Honduras; 
pork and fluid milk in Nicaragua) to 164% (chicken meat, all four countries).  With the 
exception  of  white  corn,  all  of  these  tariffs  would  be  phased  out,  either  immediately  or 
gradually, under CAFTA.
1   
The stakes are high from a rural welfare point of view.  Rural poverty ranges from 
62% of all rural residents in El Salvador to 86% in Honduras. CAFTA would be implemented 
in a context of generally deteriorating agricultural trade balances.  Between 1990 and 2003, 
both  Guatemala  and  Honduras  experienced  a  decrease  in  their  positive  agricultural  trade 
balances  while  in  El  Salvador  a  surplus  gave  way  to  a  steep  deficit  (table  1).    Only  in 
Nicaragua  did  a  positive  surplus  increase,  due  primarily  to  increases  in  bean  and  meat 
exports.    In  all  four  countries,  maize  and  rice  imports  and  fruit  and  vegetable  exports 
increased sharply.  Sugar exports increased, but in two out of the four countries (El Salvador 
and Honduras), traditional agricultural exports as a whole contracted.
2  Maize production 
decreased in Guatemala and Honduras, increased slightly in El Salvador, and rose sharply in 
Nicaragua.  Rice production contracted in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras while rising 
in Nicaragua.  Beef output stagnated in El Salvador and Guatemala, fell in Honduras, and 
rose in Nicaragua; beef imports increased (particularly in El Salvador and Guatemala) as did 
imports of poultry (particularly in Guatemala and Honduras).  Milk production rose in all 
four countries, and except in Nicaragua, milk imports increased, as well.  Changes in land use 
mirror these trends (table 2).  Between 1978 and 2001, the land area cultivated in basic grains 
(maize, rice, beans, and sorghum) decreased in Honduras, did not change significantly in El 
Salvador  and  Guatemala,  and  increased  in  Nicaragua.    In  contrast,  land  in  other  crops, 
including  non-traditional  fruits  and  vegetables,  increased  in  all  four  countries.    Only  in 
Nicaragua did the number of cattle increase.
3   8 
CAFTA  would  be  implemented  in  a  context  of  demographic  transformation,  as 
migration shifts rural population internally, to cities, and internationally, mostly to the United 
States.
4   Nevertheless, rural population shares remain high by international standards.  In 
2003, the rural share of the economically active population was 56% in Guatemala, 46% in 
Honduras, 42% in Nicaragua and 38% in El Salvador.  The shares of population living in 
rural areas ranged from 43% in El Salvador to 60% in Guatemala.  (In comparison, the rural 
shares were 25% in Mexico and 23% in the United States.)  According to the U.S. Census of 
Population, the number of EGHN-born persons living in the United States nearly doubled 
from 1990 to 2000, from 771,600 to 1,342,000.  The rural migration response potentially has 
an important influence on how agricultural trade policy reforms affect rural poverty. 
Two other considerations are critical when modeling rural welfare effects of trade-
policy  shocks:    the  heterogeneity  of  rural  households  and  the  diversification  of  these 
households’ activities and income sources. 
Rural Heterogeneity 
Tables 3a-3d present the classification of rural household groups that we use to capture the 
heterogeneity of the rural population in each Central American country, the criteria used to 
create the household categories, and the number of households (i) in each country and (ii) in 
the data bases used to estimate the models.  Landless households represent the largest number 
of rural households in all but Guatemala, where more than half of all rural households are 
subsistence producers.  In all four countries, rural households without land depend primarily 
on  salaries,  both  agricultural  and  nonagricultural,  and  remittances  from  internal  and 
international  migrants.    Subsistence  households  produce  basic  grains  on  small  holdings, 
principally for home consumption.  Because they do not participate in markets, the implicit 
value of their grain output is given by shadow prices that are endogenously determined for 
each subsistence household group.  In our DREMs as in the micro agricultural household   9 
models of Strauss (1986) and De Janvry, Fafchamps, and Sadoulet (1991), these households 
are modeled as autarkic; basic grain production is equal to demand.  A novelty of the DREM 
is its ability to represent differences in market articulation as well as in demands, production 
technologies, and activity mixes among different rural household groups. 
Production decisions in commercial households, which produce primarily for markets, 
are guided by market rather than shadow prices.  Marketed surplus from these households is 
simply the difference between output and demand, as in the staple agricultural household 
model described by Singh, Squire, and Strauss (1986).   
All household groups participate in markets for other agricultural and nonagricultural 
commodities and for factors, either as buyers (e.g., commercial households demanding labor 
for  crop  activities)  or  sellers  (landless  households  supplying  labor  to  farm  and  nonfarm 
activities).    They  differ  with  respect  to  incomes,  activity  mixes,  demand  patterns,  and 
technologies. 
Average  per-capita  incomes,  human  capital  and  landholdings  vary  widely  across 
countries as well as rural household groups.  Landless households have an average annual 
income of US$347 per capita in Honduras and $877 in El Salvador, where we were unable to 
disaggregate landless households by schooling.  Landless low-education households had an 
average per-capita income of $502 in Nicaragua and $576 in Guatemala.  Average incomes 
of subsistence producer households range from $359 (Honduras) to $510 (Nicaragua), and 
those  of  small  commercial  producers,  from  $409  (Honduras)  to  $479  (Nicaragua).    The 
highest  incomes  are  found  in  large  commercial  households  in  El  Salvador  $1,909  and 
Nicaragua ($1,955).   
With the exception of high-skilled landless households, rural household heads in all 
four countries have low levels of completed schooling, ranging from 1.3 years (low education 
landless households in Nicaragua) to 3.5 years (large commercial households in El Salvador).    10 
The range of average landholdings across household groups is larger in Nicaragua (3.9 to 
88.2  manzanas)  and  El  Salvador  (0.9  to  64.7  manzanas)  than  in  Honduras  (1.3  to  38.4 
manzanas) and Guatemala (1.3 to 8.7 manzanas).
  5  In part, these differences reflect the 
criteria that were used to classify rural households; however, both the average landholdings 
and the criteria used to construct our household groups also reflect differences in access to 
land in the four countries.  What constitutes a large holder household in Nicaragua is not the 
same as in Guatemala, for example. 
Rural Income Diversification 
In  addition  to  being  heterogeneous,  rural  households  exhibit  diversified  income  sources, 
technologies, and demands.  The same rural household commonly participates in multiple 
activities and receives income from various sources.  Policy shocks that directly affect one 
activity are transmitted to others within the household as well as to other households in the 
rural economy.  In most household groups, the share of household income from agricultural 
and livestock production is less than 50% and for some groups it does not reach 25%.  Nearly 
all  groups  obtain  around  50%  of  their  income  from  wages,  the  majority  of  which  are 
nonagricultural.    Even  commercial  households  depend  heavily  on  wage  labor  for  their 
income.  
Agricultural and livestock production in each household group is also diverse.  For 
example, in Nicaragua, medium commercial households acquire a little less than one third of 
their total value-added from the production of basic grains, and the other four producing 
groups obtain between 16% and 24% from this activity.  Livestock accounts for between 27% 
and 52%, depending on the household group.  The shares of traditional export crops are less 
than 10% of total value added in all groups except large commercial households.  Production 
of  non-traditional  crops  represents  more  than  10%  of  total  value  added  in  all  household 
groups, and non-agricultural production accounts for more than 10% in all but low-education   11 
landless  households  (8%)  and  large  commercial  producers  (5.5%).    Similar  levels  of 
diversification are found in the other three countries.  In all groups, the average household 
participates in multiple income activities, including production, wage labor, and migration. 
  There is evidence of technological diversification, reflected in differences in factor 
value-added shares in the same activity but across households.  In general, family value-
added shares are smaller in the same activities for large commercial households than for 
subsistence  producers,  while  market-input  shares  (including  hired  labor)  are  larger  for 
commercial producers.  Technological heterogeneity across households, like differences in 
market access, is generally absent from aggregate economy-wide models.  
 
The Disaggregated Rural Economy-Wide Model 
DREMs embed agricultural household models within general-equilibrium models of the rural 
economy.  Similar to Dyer, Boucher, and Taylor (2006), each agricultural household in the 
model is assumed to maximize utility  ) ; , , (
h c X G U   , defined on the consumption of home-
produced  grain (G ),  leisure  ( X ),  and  a  vector  of  other  consumption  goods  that  may  be 
purchased or home produced (c = (c1, c2,…,cI)), subject to a budget constraint (1), production 
technology (2), a time constraint (3), migrant remittances (4), and in the case of subsistence 
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U is a standard, quasi-concave utility function, β
h is a vector of household specific 
preference parameters, Li is the amount of labor used in the production of good i, and I is 
other (exogenous) transfer income. In the cash income constraint, goods are ordered such that   12 
the first v goods are produced by the household, Qi is the output of the i
th good produced by 
the household, w is the local wage rate, and F is the household’s total local labor supply (to 
both own farm and off-farm work).  Production of each good is assumed to exhibit constant 
returns  in  labor,  land,  i T ,  and  capital,  i k   (land  and  capital  are  assumed  fixed).    The 
household’s  total  time  endowment, 
h
L ,  is  allocated  among  leisure,  migration,  and  other 
work.   R  is  migrant  remittances,  which  are  a  quasi-concave  function  of  household  labor 
allocated  to  migration,  M.    The  subsistence  constraint,  C5,  which  is  not  binding  for 
commercial households, restricts consumption of home produced grain to equal production in 
subsistence households. 
  The  solution  to  this  constrained  optimization  problem  yields  a  set  of  input  and 
consumption  demands  for  each  household.    Rural  general-equilibrium  constraints  in  the 
model require that the sum of labor demands across all activities and households equal the 
sum of local labor supply.  This constraint determines the rural wage, which is endogenous in 
each of the four country models.  Thus, each rural model contains three types of prices:  (1) 
exogenous prices for tradables (non-farm wages and the prices of most goods, which are 
determined outside the rural economy but may be influenced by government policies (e.g., 
import tariffs); (2) prices exogenous to households but determined within the rural economy 
(in the present models, these are limited to rural wages); and (3) household-specific shadow 
prices  for  grain  (in  subsistence  households).    The  subsistence  household’s  endogenous 
shadow price of grain   µ   / =
h , where µ is the shadow value of the subsistence constraint 
(5) and λ is the marginal utility of income (De Janvry, Fafchamps, and Sadoulet 1991; Strauss 
1986). 
   13 
Data and Model Calibration 
To construct the rural economy-wide models, we first used data from the surveys to construct 
a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for each rural household group.  Each of these SAMs 
could be viewed as generated by a single agricultural household model.  The SAMs were then 
joined together into a rural sector-wide SAM for each country.  Nearly all of the information 
needed to calibrate the corresponding household models and the rural economy-wide models 
are contained within these SAMs, as explained below.  The four rural SAMs are interesting in 
and of themselves, because they offer a snapshot of individual groups of rural households as 
well  as  the  linkages  that  transmit  influences  of  policy  shocks  among  households.    The 
framework of the SAMs is described in appendix B.  Each household SAM consists of a set 
of 44 production activities, 5 factors, government, 9 investment accounts, and three “rest-of-
world” accounts, including the rest of the rural sector of which the household is part, the rest 
of the country, and the rest of the world outside the country.   
Unfortunately,  no  single  data  source  provides  all  of  the  information  necessary  to 
estimate the SAMs.  Because of this, data from diverse sources were used to construct a SAM 
for each rural household group in each of the four countries.  The SAMs, together with 
econometric estimates of remittance elasticities and family value-added shares, were used to 
calibrate the household models that constitute each DREM. 
The key data sources for each country include the rural components of the El Salvador 
Multi-purpose Household Survey (Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples, or EHPM) 
of  2003,  the  Guatemala  National  Living  Standards  Survey  (Encuesta  Nacional  de 
Condiciones de Vida, or ENCOVI) of 2000, and the Nicaragua Living Standards Survey 
(Encuesta  del  Nivel  de  Vida,  or  MECOVI)  of  2000.    All  three  of  these  are  nationally 
representative  and  provide  information  on  socio-demographic  variables,  production  and 
inputs, wages, migrant remittances and income from other sources, and expenditures.  A   14 
nationally representative survey was not available to construct the Honduras DREM; thus, the 
six  rural  household  SAMs  were  constructed  from  two  data  sources:    a  survey  of  rural 
households conducted by IFPRI-WUR-PRONADERS in 2001-2002 (see Jansen, Siegel, and 
Pichón 2005), and a rural household survey conducted by the University of Wisconsin and 
The World Bank in 2000-2001 (see Boucher, Barham, and Carter 2005).  The IFPRI survey 
covered 376 households and 1066 parcels in 19 cantons, and the University of Wisconsin 
survey covered 850 households in 26 cantons, mostly in the northern part of the country.  We 
primarily used the IFPRI survey to construct the Honduras household SAMs, because of its 
greater  detail  on  production  costs  and  consumption  expenditures  and  because  it  is  more 
nationally representative, as hillside zones constitute 80% of the nation’s land area.  The 
Wisconsin data were used primarily to disaggregate family value added.   
The  form  of  each  household-specific  factor  and  consumption  demand  depends  on 
technology and preferences.  On the technology side, we assume Cobb-Douglas production 
functions for each household group and good, in which the exponents are set equal to factor 
shares in value added, as implied by profit maximization and available from the household 
SAMs.
6 Consumption demands were modeled using a linear expenditure system (LES) with 
no minimum required quantities (Deaton and Muellbauer 1980), implying that preferences of 
individual groups are described by a Cobb-Douglas utility function. Budget shares, like factor 
value-added shares, were calculated from the household expenditure columns in the SAMs.
7 
The elasticities of remittance income with respect to migration were estimated by regressing 
household remittances on the number of family migrants in each household.   
The solution to the base model for each country determines labor demands in each 
activity, production, full income and consumption demands for each rural household group, 
the agricultural wage, migration, and shadow prices of grain in subsistence household groups.    15 
This base model is the starting point for carrying out simulations to explore the impacts of 
CAFTA’s agricultural provisions on rural welfare.  
 
Simulation and Welfare Analysis Results 
Simulations were conducted under three different scenarios designed to explore the impacts 
of trade policy adjustments, which are depicted in appendix A, on the rural economy of each 
of the four countries in the short, medium, and long run.  The simulation experiments are 
summarized in table 4.  Our simulations are founded on two propositions.  The first is that 
domestic  prices  of  agricultural  commodities  would  decrease  by  percentage  amounts 
equivalent  to  the  changes  in  tariffs  prevailing  prior  to  CAFTA.    The  second  is  that  the 
changes in agricultural prices would directly affect only the producers that market the good in 
question.  That is, subsistence households would not be affected directly by trade reforms, 
although they may be affected indirectly, via other rural markets.  
Simulation and Scenario Designs 
The three simulations include:  
The extreme or long-run scenario, in which an immediate elimination of tariffs for all 
agricultural goods is simulated (table 4).  This scenario illustrates what might occur without 
transition  policies,  including  gradual  removal  of  tariffs,  and  with  no  change  in  Central 
American countries’ agricultural exports to the United States.  Unlike NAFTA, CAFTA does 
not call for a reduction in tariffs for white maize.  Nevertheless, we include the removal of 
tariffs  on  white  maize  imports  in  this  simulation  because  it  is  intended  to  represent  the 
extreme case and also because there may be some substitutability between white and yellow 
maize in production and consumption.  
The  intermediate  or  medium  run  scenario  simulates  a  case  in  which  there  is 
immediate  elimination  of  tariffs  for  sensitive  agricultural  goods  whose  tariff-free  quotas   16 
exceeded imports from the United States in recent years, and/or for which the tariff phase-out 
period initiates during CAFTA’s first year.   
How to treat maize in this scenario is complicated for various reasons.  Although 
CAFTA  differentiates  between  white  and  yellow  maize,  there  is  some  degree  of 
substitutability  between  the  two.    However,  in  our  simulations  it  is  not  possible  to 
differentiate  between  yellow  and  white  maize.    Most  household  production  in  Central 
America is of the white varieties, but the available data do not distinguish maize by color.  
Additionally,  the  decision  of  whether  to  include  or  exclude  maize  (like  other  sensitive 
agricultural products) based on the difference between CAFTA quotas and imports depend on 
the period during which one measures maize imports.    
This intermediate scenario includes maize liberalization in El Salvador, Guatemala, 
and Nicaragua.  In these three countries, tariff-free quotas established for the first year of 
CAFTA significantly exceed maize imports from the Untied States; thus, one would expect a 
decrease in domestic prices in the medium but not the short run.  Maize liberalization is 
excluded from the intermediate scenario for Honduras, where tariff-free quotas are equal or 
inferior to pre-CAFTA imports and are small compared with total supply (Morley 2005).  
This scenario also includes the elimination of tariffs for beans and meats in each of the four 
countries, because a grace period was not negotiated for these products.  Finally, rice was 
included for Honduras, where the negotiated quota exceeds current imports.  
Finally,  the  low  or  short-run  scenario  simulates  a  situation  in  which  sensitive 
products with special safeguards and/or grace periods of 10 years or more are excluded.  This 
scenario excludes liberalization of rice, maize, small livestock, and milk products in each of 
the four countries.  It eliminates tariffs on large livestock and beans in Guatemala, Nicaragua, 
and  Honduras.  There  are  special  safeguards  and  a  15-year  phase-out  of  tariffs  on  these 
products in El Salvador.  The phase-out period of included products initiates in year 1 and   17 
that of excluded products begins after year 5 of CAFTA’s implementation.  The exception is 
low-quality meats in El Salvador, for which the grace period is only three years. 
The results of these scenarios depend on (i) the design of the scenarios, which reflect 
pre-reform  protection  levels  and  the  details  of  the  agreement’s  implementation  in  each 
country, (ii) the linkages among rural households and markets, which transmit the effects of 
the reforms through the rural economy, (iii) the mix of pre-reform production and income 
activities in each household group and country (for example, the concentration of production 
in sensitive activities ranges from 17.3% in large commercial households of Honduras to 70% 
in medium commercial households in Guatemala), and (iv), the model parameters, which 
shape the responses of rural household production, consumption and migration. 
Simulation Results 
Tables 5 and 6 report the results of the CAFTA simulations.  Table 5 presents simulated 
impacts on production, while table 6 reports income and welfare effects.   
Production Effects 
The  extreme  scenario  represents  a  significant  shock  for  the  rural  economies  of  all  four 
countries.  Its immediate effect is felt in the producer households that sell the affected goods 
prior to CAFTA.  Market linkages transmit the effect from these to the other rural household 
groups, including landless and subsistence households.  
Basic grain production falls sharply in almost all cases; however, there are striking 
differences between countries as well as among household groups within countries (table 5).  
Grain  production  decreases  by  26-30%  in  Guatemala,  14%  in  Honduras,  and  8-50%  in 
Nicaragua.  Supply elasticities for each household group, which can be calculated from the 
simulations,  reflect  general-equilibrium  adjustments  in  each  country’s  rural  sector.    For 
maize, these range from 0.26 to 1.15 in Nicaragua, 0.70 to 0.90 in Honduras, and 1.65 to 1.69 
in Guatemala.  In most cases, the largest decreases in supply are for the grains that were most   18 
heavily protected prior to the CAFTA reform:  rice in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Honduras 
and maize in Honduras.  Nevertheless, in some cases general-equilibrium effects mitigate the 
effects of prices changes implied by the elimination of tariffs.  This is the case in El Salvador, 
where the price of maize decreases by 20% under the extreme scenario but maize production 
falls by 1.4 and 12.2 percent in small and medium commercial households, respectively.  
Large  commercial  households  in  El  Salvador  increase  their  production  of  maize.    This 
seemingly paradoxical result is explained by the importance of livestock products in this 
group’s production mix and an even steeper decline in livestock products under this scenario.     
The  changes  in  basic  grain  prices  do  not  have  a  direct  effect  on  subsistence 
households.    However,  its  impact  is  transmitted  to  these  households  via  rural  markets, 
particularly  for  labor.    Implicit  or  shadow  prices  of  specific  basic  grains  are  almost 
unchanged in El Salvador, but they decrease 0.9-2.8% in Guatemala, 0.5-1.3% in Honduras 
and 2.1-6.7% in Nicaragua, compared to decreases in commercial prices that range from 15% 
to  62%.    Lower  shadow  prices  of  grains  accompany  decreases  in  subsistence  household 
incomes.   
Labor demands on large farms contract, causing a reduction in rural wages in all 
scenarios.  Wages fall by only 0.5% in El Salvador but nearly 3% in Guatemala, 8.5% in 
Nicaragua  and  26%  in  Honduras.    Because  of  these  wage  decreases  and  an  imperfect 
transmission  of  output  price  changes  across  households,  subsistence  grain  production 
increases  by  1.8%  and  2.1%  in  Guatemala  and  Nicaragua,  respectively,  while  remaining 
almost unchanged in El Salvador and Honduras.  This finding is reminiscent of what occurred 
in Mexico after NAFTA:  a decrease in the market price of maize was associated with an 
increase in maize production on rainfed farms (Yúnez-Naude 2002).  Dyer, Boucher, and 
Taylor (2006) refer to this as a “retreat into subsistence.”    19 
In response to decreased profitability in the previously protected importables sectors, 
rural producers channel their resources into other crop and non-crop activities and migration.  
The  cross-effect  of  tariff  elimination  on  other  activities  varies  across  households  and 
countries.    All  groups  with  a  significant  participation  in  traditional-crop  production 
(plantains, bananas, coffee) prior to reforms increase their production of these goods.  In El 
Salvador, small and medium commercial households increase their production of traditional 
crops  by  3.3%  and  0.9%,  respectively.    In  Guatemala,  production  of  traditional  crops 
increases  between  7%  (small  commercial  households)  and  45%  (large  commercial);  in 
Honduras, between 0.6% (subsistence) and 17% (medium commercial), and in Nicaragua 
between 31% (medium commercial) and 51% (subsistence).  Output of non-traditional crops 
increases more, although from a smaller base.  Total rural out-migration increases by 7.6% in 
El Salvador, 1.1% in Guatemala, 0.3% in Honduras and 0.6% in Nicaragua. 
The major difference between the extreme and intermediate scenarios is that the latter 
maintains tariffs for maize in Honduras, for rice in Guatemala and Nicaragua, and for milk 
products in all four countries.  As a result, commercial production of grains in Honduras falls 
less  under  the  intermediate  (2.3-5.0%)  than  the  extreme  (13.7%-14.4%)  scenario.      In 
Nicaragua, grain production now falls by 4.7% in small commercial households (compared 
with 7.6%) and by 9.7% and 3.3%, respectively, in medium and large commercial households 
(compared with 16.7% and 50.2%).  In Guatemala, where maize trade is liberalized under 
both scenarios, there is little difference between the two.  However, there are substantial 
differences  between  scenarios  in  El  Salvador,  where  livestock  production  is  relatively 
important.  Grain output now falls in large commercial households, and it decreases more 
than under the extreme scenario in medium households.  This result illustrates the way in 
which  non-uniform  implementation  of  trade  reforms  can  create  new  distortions  on  the 
production side, as the newly liberalized activity (in the Salvadoran case, livestock) becomes   20 
less  profitable  relative  to  the  protected  activity  (grains).    A  similar  result  is  evident  in 
Honduras, where under the intermediate scenario the tariff on maize imports persists while 
that  on  beans  is  eliminated;  maize  production  increases,  while  bean  production  by  all 
commercial households contracts sharply.  Rice production by all commercial households in 
Honduras also decreases more sharply here than under the extreme scenario. 
Under the low scenario, tariffs are maintained for maize, rice and small livestock but 
eliminated for beans and large livestock.  This mutes the negative production effects in all 
four countries.  Basic grain production is almost unchanged in El Salvador.  There is little 
difference in production effects between the intermediate and low scenarios in Honduras, 
where maize tariffs are maintained under both.  Negative grain production effects become 
positive  for  medium  commercial  households  in  Guatemala  and  for  subsistence  and  large 
commercial households in Nicaragua, once again highlighting the complexity of effects when 
trade reforms are not uniform.  
Income Effects  
Income effects are summarized in the left-hand panel of table 6.  Under the extreme scenario, 
nominal income falls for all household groups in all four countries.  In three of the countries 
(El  Salvador,  Guatemala  and  Nicaragua),  large  commercial  producers  are  hardest  hit  by 
agricultural  trade  reforms.    This  group’s  income  falls  by  4.9%  in  Nicaragua,  8%  in 
Guatemala, 8.7% in Honduras and 24.1% in El Salvador.  The sharp drop in nominal income 
for  large  commercial  households  in  El  Salvador  reflects  these  households’  production 
concentration  in  livestock  and  livestock  products  (e.g.,  milk)  prior  to  reforms.    (Price 
decreases for these products range from 15% to 61%; see table 4.)   Medium commercial 
producers also suffer relatively large nominal income losses in El Salvador, Guatemala y 
Nicaragua  (-6.3%,  -4.1%  and  -2.6%,  respectively).  In  Honduras,  the  biggest  losers  are   21 
landless households, which rely heavily on agricultural employment (-25.1%), followed by 
medium (-12.2%), small (-10.1%) and large (-8.7%) commercial farms.  
Nominal  incomes  of  subsistence  households  do  not  change  in  El  Salvador  and 
decrease  by  only  0.5%  in  Honduras  and  1.0%  in  Guatemala  and  Nicaragua.    These 
households lose primarily because of the decrease in rural wages.  Lower wages, however, 
partially counteract a negative income effect on subsistence production.  As a result, the 
supply  of  basic  grains  either  does  not  change  (El  Salvador,  Honduras)  or  else  increases 
slightly (Guatemala, Nicaragua).   
In Honduras, under the intermediate scenario the income of subsistence households 
changes little and that of commercial households decreases far less than under the extreme 
scenario.  Small commercial households lose 4.6%, compared with 10.1% under the extreme 
scenario.    Medium  commercial  households  lose  2.7%  (compared  with  10.1%),  and  large 
commercial households lose only 1% (compared with 8.7%).  Clearly, the maintenance of 
tariffs  on  maize  imports  protects  Honduran  commercial  household  incomes  but  has  little 
effect on subsistence households.  In the other countries, where the intermediate scenario 
includes  liberalization  of  maize  trade,  the  income  effects  are  similar  to  those  under  the 
extreme scenario.  The chief exceptions are medium and large commercial households in El 
Salvador. 
 Minimal  impacts  of  trade  reforms  on  production  are  mirrored  in  the  household 
income results under the low scenario.  Decreases in nominal incomes do not exceed 1% for 
any  rural  Salvadoran  household  group  or  any  subsistence  household  group  in  the  four 
countries.    Among  commercial  producers,  decreases  in  nominal  income  under  the  low 
scenario range from 0.5% to 2.5% in Guatemala, from 0.9% to 4.4% in Honduras, and from 
1.1% to 3.6% in Nicaragua.   
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Welfare Effects 
A decrease in food prices has an ambiguous effect on welfare in an agricultural household 
model, as positive effects of decreases in consumption prices may counteract the negative 
income effects described above.  Which effect dominates is an empirical question.  Assessing 
rural  welfare  effects  of  agricultural  trade  reforms  is  particularly  complex  in  a  general-
equilibrium setting, because both quantities and prices are changing.   
We employ a general-equilibrium version of the compensating variation (GECV) to 
estimate  the  rural  welfare  effects  of  CAFTA’s agricultural  provisions.    By  introducing  a 
GEVC slack variable into each household’s budget constraint and holding utility constant 
before  and  after  the  simulated  reforms,  one  obtains  the  transfer  required  to  compensate 
households taking into account all quantity and price adjustments captured by the DREM.  A 
positive value of the GECV implies that welfare decreases as a result of the reforms—that is, 
the  negative  income  effect  dominates  the  positive  consumption-price  effect.    A  negative 
GECV implies the opposite.   
Estimated GECVs are reported in the right-hand panel of table 6.  Despite a decrease 
in nominal income for all rural groups under the extreme scenario, in the majority of cases 
the GECV is negative, implying that rural household welfare increases.  This reflects the fact 
that income decreases are much smaller in percentage terms than the decreases in prices that 
result from tariff removal.  For example, in El Salvador small commercial households reap a 
benefit  from  agricultural  trade  reforms  equivalent  to  10.3%  of  their  income  prior  to  the 
reform.    Effects  on  medium  and  large  commercial  households  and  on  landless  laborer 
households are smaller but nonetheless positive.  In all countries except Honduras, the total 
GECV is negative under the extreme scenario, ranging from 1.5% to 5.7% of base income.  
In Honduras, lower consumption prices are not sufficient to compensate for a sharp decrease 
in wages for rural worker households, and the GECV is positive (14.7% of base income).    23 
The  compensating  transfer  is  small  and  positive  for  large  commercial  producers  in 
Guatemala, nil for subsistence households in El Salvador, but negative for all other rural 
household groups.  Under the intermediate scenario, the GECV is negative for all groups 
except  small  and  medium  commercial  households  in  Honduras  and  large  commercial 
households  in  Guatemala.    Under  the  low  scenario,  GECVs  are  zero  or  negative  for  all 
groups.  In some cases the estimated transfer is negative and largest in absolute value under 
the extreme scenario, due to the decrease in consumption costs that result from immediate 
tariff removal. 
These  results  might  appear  surprising  in  the  light  of  the  negative  effects  of 
agricultural trade liberalization on agricultural production.  However, they are not surprising 
when viewed from the consumption side of the rural household, which typically spends a 
significant share of its budget on food items protected by pre-CAFTA tariffs ranging from 
10-154%.    The  results  of  our  welfare  simulations  suggest  that  the  majority  of  rural 
households,  in  particular  smaller  producers,  do  not  benefit  from  pre-CAFTA  agricultural 
import tariffs.  
Limitations and Caveats 
As in any simulation model, modeling assumptions and data limitations influence the results 
of our simulations and welfare analysis.   The  model assumes that rural households can 
reallocate  resources  among  activities  in  which  they  participate  prior  to  the  reform.  
Constraints on rural households’ capacity to adjust, due for example to rural credit market 
imperfections, would tend to magnify the negative effects of trade reforms.  Indeed, in the 
majority of cases, positive cross-sector effects presented in table 5 are smaller in subsistence 
and  small-commercial  households  than  in  larger  commercial  households,  even  though 
liquidity constraints are not explicitly incorporated into the model.  For example,in Honduras, 
small  commercial  households  change  their  production  of  traditional  and  nontraditional   24 
agricultural goods only slightly in response to the removal of import tariffs on grains and 
other sensitive items, and the nontraditional agricultural supply response is more than six 
times greater for large than small commercial households.  These considerations highlight the 
need for transition policies to facilitate rural adjustments to trade reforms, particularly for 
small-producer households in which adjustment constraints are likely to be most severe. 
 
Conclusions 
The  findings  presented  in  the  paper  highlight  the  importance  of  using  a  disaggregated 
modeling approach with a focus on rural households to explore the impacts of agricultural 
trade reforms on rural welfare.  Aggregate CGE models capture important economy-wide 
effects of policy shocks; however, they miss the diversity of activities, technologies, and 
degrees of articulation with markets that characterize LDC rural economies.  Consistent with 
aggregate  CGE  models,  DREM  simulations  indicate  that  removal  of  import  tariffs  on 
agricultural goods, ceteris paribus, would negatively affect the production of these goods 
while  stimulating  other  crop  and  noncrop  activities,  including  migration.    However,  the 
production effects of agricultural trade reforms would vary widely across both countries and 
rural household groups and depend critically on the structure of rural economies, including 
market linkages that transmit influences from one household group to another. Phased-in 
trade liberalization, as called for in CAFTA, would eliminate most negative production and 
income effects on agriculture in the short run.  Nevertheless, gradual reform tends to increase 
the negative effects on the agricultural sectors for which tariffs are eliminated.  In the longer 
run, when tariffs on all agricultural imports are eliminated, income effects, while negative, 
would be small relative to the magnitude of price changes.   
By  design,  the  present  research  focuses  on  negative  aspects  of  agricultural  trade 
reforms, that is, the perception that removing agricultural tariffs would adversely affect own   25 
production,  incomes,  and  rural  welfare.    If  trade  reforms  opened  up  new  markets  for 
agricultural exports, they would also create positive rural economic linkages that could be 
studied with the models used here.  Even when one ignores this possible upside of regional 
trade integration, negative income effects of own-tariff removal are mitigated to the extent 
that  households  are  able  to  channel  resources  into  other  crop  and  non-crop  activities  in 
response  to  price  shocks.    Impediments  to  households’  capacity  to  adjust  would  tend  to 
amplify negative welfare effects of trade reforms, and partly because of this, incomes would 
be negatively affected more for some rural household groups than for others.  However, 
consistent with agricultural household theory, we find that a positive consumption effect of 
lower food prices would mitigate and, in most cases, reverse the negative effect that lower 
incomes would have on rural welfare.     26 
Footnotes 
1 Prevailing tariffs and proposed tariff adjustments under CAFTA are summarized in 
Appendix A. 
2 The principal traditional exports include sugar, bananas and coffee. 
3 The anomaly of Nicaragua’s recent agricultural production and land use trends likely 
reflects, in part, a catching up process following social upheavals in the 1980s and early 
1990s.  
4 The chief exception is migration by Nicaraguans to Costa Rica. 
5 One manzana is equal in area to 0.7 hectares. 
6  For subsistence households, the exponent was obtained by valuing output at the 
household’s shadow value of grain. 
7 Budget shares for the subsistence good were obtained by valuing this good at a shadow 
price equal to its observed per-unit cost of production.   27 
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Table 1.  Agricultural Trade Balance and Production and Trade Volumes for 
Key Products, 1990-2003 
  El Salvador  Guatemala  Honduras  Nicaragua 
  1990  2003  1990  2003  1990  2003  1990  2003 
Agricultural Trade Balance (millions of US$) 
Exports (E)   349  438  829  1358  895  665  255  479 
Imports (M)  220  817  262  885  137  567  107  285 
(E)-(M)  129  -379  567  473  758  98  148  194 
Production and Trade Volumes (thousands of metric tons) for Selected Products 
Maize                 
Production  482  508  1,034  861  446  414  177  412 
Exports  0  0  0  3  0  4  0  2 
Imports  31  400  119  539  24  225  57  80 
Beans                 
Production  47.4  76  107.6  87.8  66.3  77.4  53.5  185.2 
Exports  0.9  2.9  0  0  0  3.5  1.8  43.7 
Imports  3.9  21.9  2.1  0  0  0  8.4  1.9 
Rice                 
Production  38.1  13  28.4  22.4  36.7  9.4  66.7  181.2 
Exports  0.6  1.3  0  1  0  1.5  0  1.4 
Imports  4.5  93.5  14.1  58.7  4.9  130.9  38.7  84.3 
Beef                 
Production  27  29  64  63  96  57  51  66 
Exports  0.8  0.3  29  0.7  11.4  1  25.3  34.9 
Imports  0  15  0  5  0.03  0.3  0  0.4 
Poultry                 
Production  33  85  66  155  30  99  7  62 
Exports  0  0  0  0.4  0  0.3  0  0.2 
Imports  0  1.2  0.2  26  0  4.8  0  0.7 
Milk                 
Production  272  393  251  270  350  597  158  641 
Exports  0.3  4  0.7  9  0.3  22.8  0  61.8 
Imports  61  195  71  226  26  52  24  19 
Sugar                 
Production  273  529  975  1,912  193  300  208  346 
Exports  44.8  266.3  568.8  1,264.1  27.1  53.6  116.4  133.1 
Imports  0.07  0.07  0.01  1.5  0  0.02  15.5  0.027 
Source: FAOSTAT  30 
Table 2.  Changes in Land Use and Cattle Herds, 1978 to 2001 (Thousands of hectares and head of cattle) 
El Salvador  Guatemala  Honduras  Nicaragua 
Product 
1978  2001  1978  2001  1978  2001  1978  2001 
Basic Grains  467  484  793  795  571  494  374  623 
Traditional Agro-Exports  303  244  482  593  259  338  363  188 
Other Crops  42  57  129  221  48  73  43  53 
Head of Cattle  1,211  1,050  1,929  1,100  2,247  1,860  2,270  2,657 
Notes: Basic grains include maize, beans, rice, and sorghum; traditional agro-exports include cotton, coffee, sugar cane, sesame, bananas, and cacao;  
other crops include mostly vegetables, citrus and other fruits. 
Source: FAOSTAT 
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     Table 3.  Typologies of Rural Households 
a.  El Salvador 
Number of this type of households in… 
Code  Definition  Selection criteria 
the country  survey sample 
H1  Landless households, low skill 
Don’t own land, but may rent for agricultural production; 
household head has fewer than 6 years of education 
261,252  13,948 
H2  Landless househlds, high skill 
Don’t own land, but may rent for agricultural production; 
household head has more than 6 years of education 
71,764  4,156 
H3  Subsistence agricultural households  Own up to 10 manzanas; produce only basic grains  107,246  6,860 
H4  Small commercial producers  Own up to 10 manzanas;  diversified production  126,681  8,957 
H5  Medium-sized commercial producers  Own between 10 and 50 manzanas; diversified production  6,234  349 
H6  Large commercial producers  Own more than 50 manzanas; diversified production  401  14 
H7 
Households  with  land,  but  without 
agricultural production 
Own land, but do not produce agricultural products  2,622  155 
   Total     576,200  34,439 
Source: Gathered from the El Salvador Multi-purpose Household Survey (Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples) of 2003 published by 
DIGESTYC (Dirección General de Estadística y Censos)   32 
b.  Guatemala 
Number of this type of households in… 
Code  Definition  Selection criteria 
the country  survey sample 
H1  Landless households, low skill 
Without agricultural land; household head has fewer than 6 years 
of education.   
160,357  503 
H2  Landless househlds, high skill 
Without agricultural land; household head has more than 6 years 
of education. 
30,031  107 
H3  Subsistence agricultural households 
Comply with at least two of the three following criteria: produce 
basic grains on less than one manzana; consume more than 95% of 
their own production; do not hire non-family labor for cultuvation.  
659,922  1,931 
H4  Small commercial producers 
Own less than 5 manzanas; sell more than 5% of production; hire 
non-family labor.  
295,854  994 
H5  Medium-sized commercial producers 
Own  between  2  and  30  manzanas;  sell  more  than  5%  of 
production; hire non-family labor.  
66,752  204 
H6  Large commercial producers 
Own over 30 manzanas; sell more  than 5% of production; hire 
non-family labor.  
26,129  113 
  Total     1,239,045  3,852 
Source: Guatemala Living Standards Survey (2000) 
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c.  Honduras 
Number of this type of household in… 






H1  Landless households, low skill 
Don’t  own  land,  but  may  rent  for  agricultural 
production; household head has fewer than 6 years 
of education. 
180,000  9  39 
H2  Subsistence agricultural households 
Own less than one manzana; only produce basic 
grains.  
65,000  24  42 
H3  Small commercial producers 
Own  between  2  and  5  manzanas;  diversified 
production. 
140,000  113  223 
H4  Medium-sized commercial producers 
Own  between  5  and  10  manzanas;  diversified 
production. 
90,000  112  299 
H5  Large commercial producers 
Own  more  than  10  manzanas;  diversified 
production. 
17,000  112  184 
H6 
Households  with  land  but  without 
agricultural production 
Own  land  but  do  not  produce  agricultural 
products. 
sd  6  26 
  Total     492,000  376  813 
Sources: Total number of rural households in the country:  PNUD, Human development survey, Honduras 1998. Rural population: World Bank 2005.   34 
d.  Nicaragua 
Number of this type of household in… 
Code  Definition  Selection criteria 
the country  survey sample 
H1  Landless households, low skill 
Don’t own land, but may rent for agricultural production; 
household head has fewer than 6 years of education. 
86,541  425 
H2  Landless households, high skill 
Don’t own land, but may rent for agricultural production; 
household head has more than 6 years of education. 
11,455  57 
H3  Subsistence agricultural households 
Own less than 10 manzanas; consume more than 50% of 
their own production. 
72,124  361 
H4  Small commercial producers 
Own less than 10 manzanas; sell more than 50% of basic 
grains harvested. 
60,972  327 
H5  Medium-sized commercial producers 
Own between  10 and 50 manzanas; sell more than 50% of 
basic grains harvested. 
38,553  226 
H6  Large commercial producers 
Own more than 50 manzanas; sell more than 50% of basic 
grains harvested. 
23,451  130 
  Total     293,097  1526 
Source: Living Standards Survey, 2000   35 
Table 4.  Comparison of Simulation Designs in the Four Countries 
Simulated percentage reduction of the price of … 
Country and simulation of 






El Salvador                   
Extreme  20%  15%  40%  15%  61%  15% 
Intermediate  20%  15%  40%  15%  61%    
Low     15%     15%       
Guatemala                   
Extreme  20%  20%  29%  15%  54%  15% 
Intermediate  20%  20%    15%  54%    
Low     20%     15%       
Honduras                   
Extreme  45%  15%  45%  15%  43%  15% 
Intermediate    15%  45%  15%  43%    
Low     15%     15%       
Nicaragua                   
Extreme  10%  30%  62%  30%  31%  15% 
Intermediate  10%  30%    30%  31%    
Low     30%     30%         36 
Table 5.  Simulated Production Effects of CAFTA Agricultural Reforms (Percentage Changes) 





BG  SC  MC  LC  BG  SC  MC  LC  BG  SC  MC  LC  BG  SC  MC  LC  BG  SC  MC  LC 
El Salvador                                                             
Extreme  0.0  -12.3  -1.4  33.3  NA  -11.4  -15.7  -15.8  NA  8.2  20.5  NA  NA  10.0  21.0  NA  0.1  -30.9  -23.8  -6.5 
Intermediate  0.0  -14.5  -12.0  -6.0  NA  -13.4  -22.4  -28.9  NA  4.1  4.0  NA  NA  5.0  4.1  NA  0.0  4.8  4.4  2.5 
Low  0.0  0.4  0.6  0.0  NA  -12.2  -9.5  -1.1  NA  0.4  0.7  NA  NA  0.5  0.7  NA  0.0  0.5  0.8  0.0 
Guatemala                                         
Extreme  1.8  -27.8  -24.7  -27.7  -30.0  -25.1  -16.6  -29.9  12.0  4.6  24.8  45.3  7.3  9.3  13.0  16.0  4.6  2.4  NA  NA 
Intermediate  0.5  -27.6  -25.6  -30.0  -19.1  -12.7  -10.3  -12.6  7.0  4.8  20.5  27.9  4.3  9.1  10.8  9.5  2.7  2.4  NA  NA 
Low  -0.4  -1.3  2.7  -0.1  -13.3  -7.1  -8.5  -3.9  3.5  0.9  8.7  6.6  2.1  -0.2  4.7  1.5  1.3  -0.1  NA  NA 
Honduras                                         
Extreme  0.0  -14.4  -13.7  -13.9  -3.9  -2.6  -2.6  -4.1  0.6  8.5  17.9  3.3  0.3  11.0  20.6  71.0  1.4  17.5  6.2  -3.2 
Intermediate  0.0  -5.0  -2.3  -2.9  --3.8  -3.1  -3.3  -3.8  0.2  3.4  2.6  0.5  0.1  3.8  1.9  1.7  0.4  8.1  2.3  0.7 
Low  0.0  -4.3  -2.1  -2.3  -3.7  -3.0  -3.3  -3.8  0.1  3.2  2.6  0.4  0.1  3.6  1.9  1.6  0.4  7.6  2.3  0.7 
Nicaragua                                         
Extreme  2.1  -7.6  -16.7  -50.2  -41.4  -34.3  -37.8  -47.2  51.0  37.4  31.1  43.8  NA  88.6  71.7  107  7.7  5.8  2.8  0.5 
Intermediate  1.8  -4.7  -9.7  -3.3  -40.3  -30.8  -36.5  -49.9  44.0  31.1  23.3  24.6  NA  71.7  52.1  55.6  11.7  8.8  6.1  2.6 
Low  1.8  1.5  -4.0  3.2  -36.7  -26.3  -33.6  -48.8  40.0  22.9  17.2  20.9  NA  51.0  37.4  46.3  10.9  6.6  4.5  2.5 
Notes: BG: Producer of basic grains;   SC: Small comercial producer;   MC: Medium-sized comercial producer;  LC: Large commercial producer. 
Source: Simulations using the DREM for each country.     37 
Table 6.  Income and Welfare Effects of CAFTA Agricultural Reforms in Central America (Percentage Changes) 
Household net income  Compensating variation  Country and 
simulation  BG  SC  MC  LC  WL  All  BG  SC  MC  LC  WL  All 
El Salvador                                    
Extreme  0.0  -0.6  -6.3  -24.1  -0.3  -0.4  0.0  -10.3  -5.8  -2.9  -5.0  -5.7 
Intermediate  0.0  -0.7  -2.4  -2.2  -0.3  -0.3  0.0  -4.5  -3.9  -8.4  -2.4  -2.7 
Low  0.0  -0.1  -0.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.2  -0.3  0.0  -0.3  -0.3 
Guatemala                                      
Extreme  -0.9  -0.5  -4.1  -8.0  -0.4  -1.0  -4.8  -6.7  -5.7  0.3  -6.2  -5.2 
Intermediate  -0.8  -0.7  -3.7  -5.0  -0.6  -0.9  -2.1  -3.5  -2.8  0.4  -2.9  -2.4 
Low  -0.7  -0.5  -2.5  -1.7  -0.6  -0.7  -1.2  -0.8  -1.0  -0.6  -0.8  -1.0 
Honduras                                      
Extreme  -0.5  -10.1  -12.2  -8.7  -25.1  -12.0  -0.4  -1.9  -4.4  -1.1  14.7  1.1 
Intermediate  -0.1  -4.6  -2.7  -1.0  -0.9  -1.7  -0.2  2.5  0.4  -3.5  -7.6  -2.6 
Low  -0.1  -4.4  -2.7  -0.9  -0.9  -1.6  -0.2  2.4  0.4  -3.4  -7.6  -2.6 
Nicaragua                                      
Extreme  -1.2  -1.8  -2.6  -4.9  -1.5  -2.3  -1.6  -1.6  -2.1  -0.6  -2.1  -1.5 
Intermediate  -0.9  -1.4  -2.1  -4.2  -1.2  -1.8  -0.9  -0.9  -1.0  -0.1  -1.4  -0.8 
Low  -0.8  -1.1  -1.6  -3.6  -0.9  -1.5  0.0  0.2  -0.2  0.7  -0.5  0.1 
Notes: Compensating Variation is defined as the transfer required to maintain households at the same level of welfare as before the reform.  This 
transfer is expressed as a percentage of pre-reform income.  A negative transfer means that the reform increases household welfare.  
BG: Producer of basic grains;   SC: Small comercial producer;   MC: Medium-sized comercial producer;  LC: Large commercial producer; WL: 
Without land, low skill 
Source: Simulations using the DREM for each country.    38 
Appendix A. Synthesis of Adjustment Process for Sensitive Agricultural and Livestock Products Under CAFTA 
Prevailing tariffs(%)  Category of tariff reduction 
Product 
El Salvador  Guatemala  Honduras  Nicaragua  El Salvador  Guatemala  Honduras  Nicaragua 
Rice  40  29.2  45  45-62  P  P  P  P 
Yellow corn  15  35  45  15  O  C  O  E 
White corn  20  20  45  10  H  H  H  H 
Beans  15-20  20  15  30  D  SVE  C and D  D 
Beef  15  15  15  30         
   -High quality cuts                 
   -Low quality cuts          D and O  C  D and O
a  Q (*) 
Pork  40  15  15  15  O  D  O  D 
Chicken (dark meat)  164.4  164.4  164.4  164.4  P  P  P  P 
Milk  40  15  15  15  F  F  F  F 
Powdered Milk  20  15  15  60  F  F  F  F  
Cheese  40  15  15  15-40  F  F  F  F 
Notes: 
C Elimination of tariffs in 10 annual stages from the time the treaty takes effect.  By the 1st of January of year 10, tariffs will be completely eliminated.  
D Elimination of tariffs in 15 annual stages from the time the treaty takes effect.  By the 1st of January of year 15, tariffs will be completely eliminated. 
E Base level of tariff is maintained from years 1 to 6.  On January 1
st of year 7, tariffs will be reduced by 33% in 4 annual stages.  In year 11, tariffs will be 
reduced by   67% in 5 annual stages.  By January 1
st of year 15, tariffs will by completely eliminated  
F Base level of tariff is maintained from years 1 to 10.  On January 1
st of year 11, tariffs will be reduced by 33% in 4 annual stages.  Starting from year 11, 
tariffs will be reduced in 10 equal yearly stages, with tariffs completely eliminated by January 1
st of year 20. 
H The country will continue receiving Most Favored Nation status.  In the case of white corn, tariffs will not be reduced, but quotas will be increased.  
O Reduction will be over 15 years in 9 stages: 40% from year 7 to 11; 60% from year 12 to 15.  
P Reduction will be over 18 years in 7 stages: 33% from year 11 to 14; 67% from year 15 to 18.  
Q Reduction will be over 15 years: 15% from year 1 to 3, 33% from year 4 to 8, and  67% from year 9 to 15 
SVE Special Safeguards 
a) No quota 
Sources: CEPAL (2004), tables 2 to 14, and Morley (2005), table 3.    39 
Appendix B.  Accounts in Rural Household SAMs 
Production activities  
Sector  Definition  Sector  Definition  Sector  Definition 
MAIZ  Corn  OTRA  Other traditional crops  MANI  Peanut 
FRIJ  Beans  PINA  Pineapple  AJON  Sesame 
ARRO  Rice  PITA  Pitaya  SOYA  Soy 
SORG  Sorghum  MALA  Malanga  FLOR  Flowers 
GMAY  Large Livestock  CACO  Cacao  CITR  Citrus 
GMEN  Small Livestock  TUBE  Tubers  PAPA  Papaya 
PAST  Pasture  YUCA  Yuca  MANG  Mango 
APIC  Beekeeping  CAMO  Sweet potato  AGUA  Avocado 
BANA  Banana  CEBO  Onion  OPER  Other permanent crops 
PLAT  Plantain  TOMA  Tomatoes  MELO  Melon and watermelon 
CAFE  Coffee  PIMI  Peppers  CHAY  Chayote 
AZUC  Sugar  LECH  Lettuce  AYOT  Ayote 
CARD  Cardamom  ZANA  Carrot  PIPI  Pipían 
TABA  Tobacco  OKRA  Okra  OFRU  Other fruits 
SORI  Industrial Sorghum  REMO  Beet       
   40 
 
Factors     Households 
Factor  Definition     Factor  Definition 
FAMI  Family factors     H1  Households without land, low skill 
LAHP  Agricultural workers     H2  Subsistence agricultural households 
LNHP  Non-agricultural workers     H3  Small commercial households 
KTIE  Land     H4  Medium-sized commercial households 
KMAQ  Physical capital     H5  Large commercial households 
KANI  Animal capital     H6  Households of agricultural laborers 
      H7  Households with land but without ag. production   
Savings and Investment      Rest of World 
Savings  Definition      Place  Definition 
AHFI  Financial savings      RRUR  Rest of rural sector  
AHAN  Livestock investment      RPAI  Rest of country 
AHTI  Land investment      RMUN  Rest of world 
AHPL  Plantation investment         
AHIN  Infrastructure investment         
AHVI  Housing investment         
AHOT  Other investment         
AHED  Human capital investment-education         
AHSA  Human capital investment-health         